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I. INTRODUCTION
We study how to use quantum key distribution (QKD) in common
optical network infrastructures and propose a method to overcome its
distance limitations. QKD is the first technology offering information
theoretic secret-key distribution that relies only on the fundamental
principles of quantum physics. Point-to-point QKD devices have
reached a mature industrial state; however, these devices are severely
limited in distance, since signals at the quantum level (e.g. single
photons) are highly affected by the losses in the communication
channel and intermediate devices. To overcome this limitation, in-
termediate nodes (i.e. repeaters) are used. Both, quantum-regime and
trusted, classical, repeaters have been proposed in the QKD literature,
but only the latter can be implemented in practice. As a novelty,
we propose here a new QKD network model based on the use
of not fully trusted intermediate nodes, referred as weakly trusted
repeaters. This approach forces the attacker to simultaneously break
several paths to get access to the exchanged key, thus improving
significantly the security of the network. We formalize the model
using network codes and provide real scenarios that allow users to
exchange secure keys over metropolitan optical networks using only
passive components [1].
II. WEAKLY TRUSTED REPEATERS
Network coding is a paradigm where the intermediate nodes,
instead of simply forwarding the incoming flows through the outgoing
paths (according to some routing algorithm), distribute a function of
the inputs through each outgoing path.
We will consider every link in a QKD network to be a private link
between its neighboring nodes. This restricts eavesdropping to the
intermediate network nodes; only a curious router can gain access
to network messages. This ability to extend the traditional security
perimeter to also cover the communication channel between two
QKD nodes is the consequence of the laws of quantum physics and is
the key attribute of QKD. However, this property cannot be extended
to classical repeaters. In essence, any classical repeater node in a
chain of quantum links gets meaningful information [2]. In order
to prevent the curious routers from accessing information, we can
create extended source messages by adding randomness to the source
messages. Formally, the messages are drawn from the direct product
of the source alphabet M, and a random key alphabet K.
Let us consider a set of jWj independent eavesdroppers. Every
w 2 W may receive the messages traversing a fixed collection of
nodes, or eavesdropping pattern Bw, in order to recover a subset of
the source message Mw. In consequence an eavesdropper has access
to YBw = fYe : e 2 A(v); v 2 Bwg, the messages traversing Bw.
Note that the elements in W , i.e. eavesdroppers, are elements of the
power set of V and in consequence potentially overlapping. We say
that the intermediate nodes in the network graph are weakly trusted
repeaters (WTR) to reflect the assumption that no further cooperation
with the eavesdroppers is performed.
Following [2], a network code is admissible over this eavesdrop
network model if every user node u can recover Mu and the
information that every eavesdropper w holds about Mw does not
reduce its entropy:
H(MwjYu) = 0
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Fig. 1. Secret-key rate, in bits per qubit sent, of two different QKD systems,
GYS and Clavis, using the BB84 protocol with decoy states as a function of
the absorptions in the network. Losses due to network devices are depicted
using a shadowed region.
and 8w 2 W :
H(MwjYBw ) = H(Mw)
These two conditions are called the secure and decodable condi-
tions.
III. NETWORK DESIGN
To secure a metropolitan optical network, a quantum channel has
to be created among any two nodes of the access networks. Therefore,
first we connect an emitter to the end of an access network. Losses,
due to fiber and network components, do not allow to directly plug the
receiver in a different access network (see Fig. 1). Intermediate nodes
are needed. Possible locations are the immediate backbone node or its
closest neighbors. If we follow this idea we obtain a bipartite graph
with emitters placed at the end of the access network and receivers
at the backbone nodes. Each emitter has several outgoing links: to
the receiver in its own backbone node and the neighboring ones. The
type of QKD device selected for each node is not arbitrary. Receivers
are more expensive and difficult to maintain due to the single-photon
detectors, hence they are kept at the telco installations.
This shows that telecom networks not only suit QKD, but they are
flexible enough to provide several alternative paths among two nodes
(at least in metro areas). Therefore, the network coding approach
described in Section II can be used. This implies that a commercial
optical network with improved security and resilience, as compared
to the traditional scheme, can be designed using QKD and WTR.
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